Richmond Journal of Law and Technology
Volume 17 | Issue 1

Article 3

2010

Blast Off ? — Strict Liability’s Potential Role in the
Development of the Commercial Space Market
Mark Flores

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt
Part of the Torts Commons, and the Transportation Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Mark Flores, Blast Off? — Strict Liability’s Potential Role in the Development of the Commercial Space Market, 17 Rich. J.L. & Tech 2
(2010).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt/vol17/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Richmond Journal of Law
and Technology by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 1

BLAST OFF? – STRICT LIABILITY’S POTENTIAL ROLE IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMERCIAL SPACE MARKET
By Mark Flores∗
Cite as: Mark Flores, Blast off? – Strict Liability’s
Potential Role in the Development of the Commercial
Space Market, XVII RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 (2010),
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v17i1/article2.pdf.
I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
The sun rises over the mountains in Southern New Mexico and the
windows of Spaceport America blind those looking on at the terminal. A
sudden boom shakes the ground and a plane unlike any other takes off
toward the sky, leaving Spaceport America in the distance.1 Virgin
Galactic’s2 WhiteKnightTwo, bolstering an impressive 140-foot wing span
∗

Federal Law Clerk to the Hon. Joseph M. Hood, District Judge, Eastern District of
Kentucky. J.D., University of Kentucky College of Law; B.J., Business Foundations
Certificate, University of Texas at Austin. The author would like to express his thanks to
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1

See
generally
Image
Gallery,
SPACEPORT
AM.,
http://www.spaceportamerica.com/news/photo-gallery.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2010)
(inspiring this fictional account through drawings of Spaceport America).
2

While this Article focuses on Virgin Galactic, other entities are developing commercial
space travel technologies. See, e.g., Associated Press, U.S. Space Tourism Firm
Launches S. Korea Deal, DAILY RECORD (Morristown, N.J.), Dec. 18, 2009, at
UPDATES01 (reporting that Xcor Aerospace recently struck a deal with South Korea to
conduct launches in that nation). Xcor must still complete the approval process and
obtain the necessary export licensing, but the spaceship should be in the air by 2011. See
id.
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and the capacity to carry close to 8,000 pounds of fuel, speeds skyward
carrying SpaceShipTwo, measuring in at sixty feet in length with a fortytwo foot wide wing span, under its belly.3 SpaceShipTwo carries six
passengers and two crew members, all of whom wait anxiously for their
ship to leave WhiteKnightTwo and, eventually, Earth.4
[2]
During the first stage of the voyage, WhiteKnightTwo carries its
cargo, including the eight lucky passengers, to an altitude of 50,000 feet.5
As described by Virgin Galactic, the ride up “is marked with quiet
contemplation but there’s an air of confidence and eager anticipation”
before SpaceShipTwo is released from the grasps of its carrier.6 After
that, pure excitement fills the passengers:
[There is] a brief moment of quiet before a wave of
unimaginable but controlled power surges through the craft.
You are instantly pinned back into your seat, overwhelmed
but enthralled by the howl of the rocket motor and the eyewatering acceleration which, as you watch the read-out, has
you travelling in a matter of seconds, at almost 2500mph,
over 3 times the speed of sound.7
[3]
SpaceShipTwo speeds away from Earth into the upper layers of the
atmosphere.8 The thrilling view from the windows changes from familiar

3

See Guy Norris, Quest for Space at Virgin Galactic, AVIATION WEEK (Sept. 4, 2009),
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/VI
RG09049.xml.
4

See id.

5

See Overview – Experience, VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/
overview/experience/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2010).
6

See id.

7

Id.

8

See id.
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blue skies to the black skies of space,9 and the passengers’ senses are
alerted to the sudden change in their environment as “the world contained
in [their] spaceship has completely transformed.”10 Passengers, likely for
the first time, experience the magic of outer space.
[T]he gravity which has dominated every movement
you’ve made since the day you were born is not there
anymore. There is no up and no down and you’re out of
your seat experiencing the freedom that even your dreams
underestimated. After a graceful mid-space summersault
you find yourself at a large window [looking at] a view that
you’ve seen in countless images but the reality is so much
more beautiful and provokes emotions that are strong but
hard to define.11
[4]
The crew then requests passengers to return to their seats in
preparation for re-entry.12
Gravity returns and passengers ready
themselves for the strong g-forces associated with the return to Earth.13 As
the ship glides home, the passengers return to familiar surroundings and
carry the knowledge “that life will never quite be the same again.”14
[5]
Such a voyage might seem out of this world, but Virgin Galactic
expects to start commercial space flights in 2011.15 Virgin Galactic
already has a booking page on its website where, for a fee of $200,000 a
9

Id.

10

See Overview – Experience, VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/
overview/experience/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2010).
11

Id.

12

See id.

13

See id.

14

Id.

15

See Norris, supra note 3.
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ticket and deposits starting at $20,000, potential passengers can reserve a
seat on one of the first flights.16 While the $200,000 price tag may prove
too high for most people, Virgin Galactic promises the price will decrease
over time,17 much like the price of flat-screen televisions.18 Yet even with
the $200,000 bill, more than 350 people, collectively paying close to $40
million in deposits, already have incurred the cost to secure a seat.19
[6]
Because commercial space travel is such a novel and unfamiliar
experience, after potential passengers fill out the booking form Virgin
Galactic contacts them to answer any questions.20 Additionally, Virgin
Galactic employs fifty travel consultants trained specifically to provide
specialized information about the space flights.21 The training for these
specialized travel consultants includes trips to the “Kennedy Space Center
at Cape Canaveral, Florida to learn about the history, physics, medical
implications and specific flight details that are involved in suborbital
flight, and experiencing weightlessness on ZERO-G, a specially modified
Boeing 727.”22
[7]
But despite what appears to be the inevitable creation of a booming
commercial space transportation industry, the possibility of commercial
16

Booking, VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/booking/ (last visited Nov.
7, 2010).
17

See Overview – Space Tickets, VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/
overview/space-tickets/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
18

See Norris, supra note 3. See generally David Goldman, Flat-Screen TV Prices To
Plunge for Holiday Season, CNNMONEY.COM (Sept. 23, 2010, 03:44 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/09/23/technology/lcd_tv_prices/ index.htm.
19

See Park Avenue Travel; Park Avenue Travel’s Joshua Bush, Local Accredited Space
Agent to Witness World Premiere of Virgin Galactic SpaceShipTwo, DEF. & AEROSPACE
BUS., Dec. 23, 2009, at 64 [hereinafter Park Avenue Travel].
20

See Booking supra note 16.

21

See Park Avenue Travel, supra note 19.

22

Id.
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space travel raises questions of balancing safety concerns against the
further development of a burgeoning business.23 Virgin Galactic claims
safety “is at the heart of the design of [its] new vehicles and will be
engrained in the culture of [its] space line operation.”24 In particular,
Virgin Galactic points to two safety features of its aircraft.25 First,
SpaceShipTwo will use a hybrid rocket motor, which gives pilots control
of the rocket’s thrust, and the ability to abort during the boost phase.26
Second, SpaceShipTwo will use a feathered re-entry system that allows
the spacecraft to re-enter the atmosphere without the excessive heat
commonly associated with this phase of space travel.27
[8]
Yet Virgin Galactic owner Sir Richard Branson admits that “[n]o
new technology is without its risks, [a fact] one has to accept.”28 In 2004,
the prototype for SpaceShipTwo “started rolling corkscrewlike on its way
into space.”29 And in 2007, three engineers employed by Scaled
23

See Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-492, 118
Stat. 3974 (codified as amended in 49 U.S.C. ch. 701 (2004)) (amending 49 U.S.C.
70101, which identifies Congressional findings as to commercial space launch activities,
to note that “a critical area of responsibility for the Department of Transportation is to
regulate the operations and safety of the emerging commercial human space flight
industry; [and that] the public interest is served by creating a clear legal, regulatory, and
safety regime for commercial human space flight; and [finally that] the regulatory
standards governing human space flight must evolve as the industry matures so that
regulations neither stifle technology development nor expose crew or space flight
participants to avoidable risks as the public comes to expect greater safety for crew and
space flight participants from the industry.”).
24

Overview - Safety, VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/overview/safety/
(last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
25

See id.

26

See id.

27

See id.

28

Transcript of NBC Nightly News: Richard Branson To Offer Citizen Space Travel in 18
Months (NBC television broadcast Dec. 7, 2009).
29

Id.
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Composites, LLC, a company partnering with Virgin Galactic to develop
commercial space travel, died in a rocket engine explosion.30 Still,
Branson’s faith in the technology is unwavering. As a testament to his
confidence, Branson plans to take several family members with him on the
pioneering first flight.31 Such an intention indicates that, regardless of any
inherent risks, Virgin Galactic is ready to move forward.32 As accredited
Space Agent Joshua Bush stated, “[w]e’ve already taken deposits from
clients for a space flight, and the [December 23, 2009] unveiling of
SpaceShipTwo moves us one step closer to actual travel.”33
[9]
Although Virgin Galactic has taken steps to assure the public that
its flights are safe, the federal government appears to struggle with exactly
how to regulate this new method of travel.34 In particular, the government
must determine how much, if any, regulation of spacecrafts like
SpaceShipTwo and WhiteKnightTwo is appropriate to ensure the safety of
those involved, while at the same time not interfering with the further
development of the industry.35 The Federal Aviation Administration
(“FAA”) and the Office of Commercial Space Transportation (“AST”)

30

See id; Ian O’Neill, Scaled Composites at Fault for Fatal Explosion, UNIVERSE TODAY,
http://www.universetoday.com/12506/scaled-composites-at-fault-for-fatal-explosion/
(Jan. 19, 2008).
31

See Transcript, supra note 28.

32

See id.

33

Park Avenue Travel, supra note 19.

34

See The Federal Regulatory Approach to Commercial Space Transportation: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Sci. and Space of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp.,
111th Cong. 4 (2010) (statement of Dr. George C. Nield, Assoc. Adm’r for the Office of
Commercial Space Transp., Fed. Aviation Admin.), available at http://legislative.
nasa.gov/hearings/3-18-10%20NIELD.pdf.
35

See id. at 4-6; supra note 23.
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have dealt with similar questions since 2003.36 To evaluate this issue, the
FAA and AST have asked following:
How does the addition of humans on board RLVs [reusable
launch vehicles] affect/challenge FAA/AST’s regulatory
responsibility and regulatory approach? To what level of
safety should they be allowed to fly.
Should FAA/AST regulate human space flight by setting a
limit on acceptable risk for humans on board RLVs?
How should FAA/AST ensure the safety of humans on
board RLVs?
Are there lessons learned from commercial aviation that
may be applicable to commercial space operations? What
are they short of certification?37
What, if any, type of liability, financial responsibility
requirements, and/or liability risk-sharing regime should
the U.S. government, via FAA/AST, seek to establish to
protect passengers on board RLVs?”38

36

See Virgin Galactic SpaceShip - Aerospace Technology, AEROSPACE-TECH.,
http://www.aerospace-technology.com/projects/virgin-spaceship/ (last visited Nov. 10,
2010) (noting the maiden voyage of SpaceShip One occurred on May 20, 2003).
37

Patricia Grace Smith, Assoc. Adm’r for Commercial Space Transp., FAA, Long-Term
Scenario for the Earth and Orbital Infrastructure, Int’l Air & Space Symposium and
Exposition (July 17, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.faa.gov
/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/PGS_AIAA_03-07-17.htm).
38

Charity Trelease Ryabinkin, Note, Let There Be Flight: It’s Time to Reform the
Regulation of Commercial Space Travel, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 101, 132- 33 (2004) (citing
Office of the Assoc. Admin’r for Commercial Space Transp., Commercial Human Space
Flight, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (2003), http://ast.faa.gov/COMSTAC/May 2003/WongHuman_Space_Flight.ppt).
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[10] The answers to these questions do not come easily. If the
government regulates too heavily, the industry could suffer the way some
claim the rail industry has suffered due to overregulation by the Interstate
Commerce Commission.39 With too little regulation, the industry presents
safety concerns for the passengers, employees, and the general public.40
Interestingly, products liability may present an unlikely solution to this
problem. Instead of attempting heavy regulation, Congress should adopt a
strict liability approach for space flight operators similar to the approach
used by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck
Corp.41
[11] This Article evaluates the current and likely future state of federal
regulation with respect to commercial space travel and proposes the
adoption of the Francioni model of strict liability as a means to protect
both public safety and the continued development of the space travel
industry. Section II describes the current state of space travel regulation,
particularly as it pertains to reusable launch vehicles (“RLVs”). Section
III addresses how the international community handles liability regarding
commercial space travel, as well as jurisdictional questions that may arise
as a result of accidents associated with commercial space travel. Section
IV discusses a plaintiff’s ability, or lack thereof, to raise a claim under
common law negligence, and Section V demonstrates why strict liability
as applied to the manufacturers of the spacecraft will not protect
passengers from the dangers of space travel. Finally, Section VI will
39

See generally Albert Churella, Saving the Railroad Industry to Death: The Interstate
Commerce Commission, the Pennsylvania Railroad, and the Unfulfilled Promise of RailTruck Cooperation, BUS. & ECON. HIST. ON-LINE (2006), http://www.thebhc.org/
publications/BEHonline/2006/churella.pdf.
40

See Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-492, 118
Stat. 3974 (codified as amended in 49 U.S.C. ch. 701 (2004)) (amending 49 U.S.C.
70101, which identifies Congressional findings as to commercial space launch activities,
to note that “the regulatory standards governing human space flight must evolve as the
industry matures so that regulations neither stifle technology development nor expose
crew or space flight participants to avoidable risks as the public comes to expect greater
safety for crew and space flight participants from the industry.”).
41

See generally Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 372 A.2d 736, 739 (Pa. 1977).
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explain how the application of the Francioni model of strict liability will
ensure the safety of the passengers, and, just as importantly, maintain the
regulation-free environment essential for successful commercial space
travel.
II. WAITING FOR THE FIRST MOVE – THE CURRENT STATE OF
COMMERCIAL SPACE TRAVEL REGULATION
[12] The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 created the AST,
which originally operated within the Department of Transportation.42 In
1995, AST oversight was reassigned to the FAA, under which the AST
continues to serve as one of six operating offices, and the only department
responsible for space-related matters.43 According to regulation, the AST
operates as “a line of business within the Federal Aviation Administration
[FAA],”44 and works with the FAA to regulate commercial space
transportation, which includes maintenance of extensive licensing
procedures for the operation of launch and re-entry sites.45 The primary
duties of the AST include:
Regulat[ing] the commercial space transportation industry,
to ensure compliance with international obligations of the
United States and to protect the public health and safety,
safety of property, and national security and foreign policy
interests of the United States;
Encourag[ing], facilitat[ing], and promot[ing] commercial
space launches and reentries by the private sector;
Recommend[ing] appropriate changes in Federal statutes,
treaties, regulations, policies, plans, and procedures; and

42

Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3055 (1984); ALEXANDER
T. WELLS & CLARENCE C. RODRIGUES, COMMERCIAL AIR SAFETY 27 (Scott Grillo &
David E. Fogarty eds., 4th ed. 2004).
43

WELLS & RODRIGUES, supra note 42 at 26-27.

44

14 C.F.R. § 401.1 (2010).

45

See generally 14 C.F.R. §§ 415, 433 (2010).
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Facilitat[ing] the strengthening and expansion of the United
States space transportation infrastructure.46
[13] While the FAA does not have to follow the framework used to
develop the safety standards for the nation’s airports and commercial
aviation providers to develop regulations for the commercial space travel
industry,47 a brief discussion of the history of regulation in the commercial
aviation industry provides guidance into what the future of commercial
space travel regulation may look like. The remainder of this section will
take a brief look at the past and current state of commercial aviation and
discuss the high potential of agency capture under the current regime.
A. A Brief Look Back – The FAA Regulation and Deregulation
of the Commercial Aviation Industry
[14] The difficulties associated with safety regulation in the aviation
industry have existed since the mid-1920s, when pilots returning from
World War I “bought surplus war aircraft and went into business.”48 At
the outset, the aircraft were used primarily for traveling aerial shows
because the lower costs and ease of accessibility of the country’s extensive
water and rail systems made commercial air travel prohibitively
expensive.49 It was only in the wake of the creation of the United States
Air Mail Service, and the regulations mandating that pilots attain a
minimum of 500 hours of flying experience to be eligible for aerial mail
delivery, that commercial aviation began to take form.50
46

About the Office, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://www.faa.gov/about/
office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/ about/ (last updated Feb. 17, 2010) (describing the
Office of Commercial Space Transportation, a branch of the Federal Aviation
Administration); see 49 U.S.C. §§ 70101-19 (2006).
47

In fact, the FAA likely will take a much more streamlined approach because it has a
better idea of what works based on its previous work regulating the commercial aviation
industry.
48

WELLS & RODRIGUES, supra note 42, at 3.

49

See id.

50

See id. at 3-4.
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[15] Since the federal government had not created a safety program for
aviators, “a number of states [passed] legislation requiring aircraft
licensing and registration.”51 Local governments also added to the safety
regulations, “enact[ing] ordinances regulating flight operations and pilots,
[which created] a patchwork of safety-related requirements. . . .”52
[16] Eventually, Congress passed the Air Commerce Act of 1926,
which gave the Department of Commerce the authority to regulate air
commerce.53 In accordance with this authority, the Air Commerce Act of
1926 imposed upon the Department of Commerce several duties,
including the duties to: promote air commerce, which entailed the
responsibility to create air navigation facilities and airports, investigate air
navigation accidents, investigate the development of the aeronautical
industry, and advise the executive branch regarding the improvement of
air navigation; regulate and maintain the standards of acceptable aircraft,
airmen and facilities; regulate facilities, crafts and airmen connected with
interstate and foreign commerce; and create air traffic safety rules.54 The
authority and duties identified in the Air Commerce Act of 1926 laid the
foundation for the establishment of what is now the FAA, and are the
same regulations and responsibilities under which the FAA continues to
function.55
[17] The first federal aviation regulations were crafted following
“substantial input from aircraft manufacturers, air transport operators, and
51

Id. at 4.

52

Id. at 4.

53

See Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568. The act defines “Air
Commerce” as “transportation in whole or in part by aircraft of persons or property for
hire, navigation of aircraft in furtherance of a business, or navigation of aircraft from one
place to another for operation in the conduct of a business.” Id.
54

See id. at §§ 2-3, 5-7; see also WELLS & RODRIGUES, supra note 42, at 4.

55

The FAA carries on the same responsibilities even after its move from the Department
of Commerce to the Department of Transportation. See History, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
http://www.faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
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the insurance industry.”56 With time, these safety measures decreased the
number of crashes among private and passenger aircraft, such that
[b]etween 1930 and 1932, the fatality rate per 100 million passenger-miles
declined by 50 percent.”57 But a succession of devastating accidents in the
1950s exposed a glaring need to improve the aviation safety regime.58
This revelation prompted Congress to enact the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, which established the Federal Aviation Agency and “provide[d] for
the regulation and promotion of civil aviation in such a manner as to best
foster its development and safety, and to provide for the safe and efficient
use of the airspace by both civil and military aircraft.”59
[18] The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 granted the Federal Aviation
Agency a wide range of powers relating to the regulation of United States
airspace, including the authority to: further the development of domestic
and foreign air commerce; create a framework for the use of airspace; and
formulate rules and regulations regarding the practices, standards and
procedures of airspace use, and the materials, construction and standards
of aircraft designs.60 From its inception, the agency grew rapidly,
increasing by 10,000 employees between 1959 and 1961.61 In 1966,
Congress enacted the Department of Transportation Act, which
transitioned agency oversight to the Department of Transportation and

56

WELLS & RODRIGUES, supra note 42, at 4.

57

Id. at 5.

58

Paul Stephen Dempsey, Independence of Aviation Safety Investigation Authorities:
Keeping the Foxes from the Henhouse, 75 J. AIR L. & COM. 223, 263 (2010). The events
triggering the enactment of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 included a 1956 mid-air
collision over the Grand Canyon, a 1957 mid-air collision over California, and a 1958
mid-air collision over an area close to Las Vegas, Nevada. Id.
59

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731.

60

See id. at §§ 305, 307(a)-(c), 312(a), 316.

61

See WELLS & RODRIGUES, supra note 42, at 8.
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[19] The history of the FAA also involves overregulation and, more
recently, evidence of agency capture.63 Before 1978, the government
dictated permissible air routes and ticket prices.64
The Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 – authorized amidst congressional speculation
that deregulation would lead to a decrease in the cost of air fares –
changed that standard.65 The New York Times aptly described the Airline
Deregulation Act as the government’s transformation of “air travel into
mass transportation.”66 By 2000, airlines carried three times as many
passengers at rates forty percent lower than the fares airlines charged in
the late 1970s.67
[20] But while industry deregulation blew open the door for air travel,
economic growth created problems for air traffic controllers trying to keep
up with increased demand.68 Because there are a limited number of
62

Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931, § 3(e)(1)-(2)
(1966); see WELLS & RODRIGUES, supra note 42, at 8.
63

See Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (and Airplanes): The Federal
Aviation Administration, “Agency Capture,” and Airline Security, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 381, 405-09 (2002). “Capture theory is based on the notion that proper
public focus of governmental agencies can be effectively distracted by the private
interests of regulated entities.” Id. at 392.
64

See WELLS & RODRIGUES, supra note 42, at 9.

65

See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705; WELLS &
RODRIGUES, supra note 41, at 9.
66

Id.

67

See Laurence Zuckerman & Matthew L. Wald, GRIDLOCK IN THE SKIES: A Special
Report.; Crisis for Air Traffic System: More Passengers, More Delays, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
5, 2000, at A1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9500E0DE1F30F936A3575AC0A9669C8B63&scp=1&sq=zuckerman%20gridlock&st=
cse.
68

See generally id.
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suitable areas for air traffic facilities and a limited number of usable air
traffic routes, it is inevitable that the increasing demand resulting from
economic growth will far exceed supply.69 As a congressional blue-ribbon
panel noted, “[t]he [FAA] currently lacks the organizational, management,
and financial wherewithal to keep pace with the dynamic aviation
community.”70 Commentators also have suggested the FAA’s dual
mandate of “the protection of airline safety on one hand, and the
‘fostering’ of successful air commerce . . . on the other” has caused
problems leading to agency capture,71 and at least one commentator has
suggested agency capture might have contributed to the September 11,
2001 attacks.72
B. NASA – The New Consumer of Commercial Space Technology
[21] While the impending birth of the commercial space market has
prompted the need for a regulatory or liability scheme to govern the
industry, recent developments have only made the need more pressing. In
an April 2010 speech, President Barack Obama encouraged private
companies to pursue innovations that will benefit the United States’ space
program.73 Prior to this speech, the President, in a February 2010 budget
request, proposed the cancellation of the Constellation program, which
intended to return astronauts to the moon, and looked to private companies
to supply spacecraft for the government.74 Notably, this includes a call for

69

See generally id.

70

NAT’L CIVIL AVIATION REVIEW COMM’N, AVOIDING AVIATION GRIDLOCK: A
CONSENSUS FOR CHANGE (1997), available at http://www.avweb.com/other/
ncarcrpt/ncarcrpt.pdf.
71

See Niles, supra note 63, at 407.

72

See id. at 410-12.

73

Kenneth Chang, In Call to Alter NASA, Obama Vows Renewed Space Program, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2010, at A18.
74

Id.
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the private sector to develop spacecraft “for carrying astronauts to the
International Space Station.”75
[22] While the President claimed he was “100 percent committed to the
mission of NASA and its future,” critics began to take aim at the new
plan.76 Former astronauts Neil Armstrong, Jim Lovell and Eugene Cernan
stated in a letter that President Obama’s budget for NASA was
“devastating” to the country’s space program, and that “[w]ithout the skill
and experience that actual spacecraft operation provides, the [United
States] is far too likely to be on a long downward slide to mediocrity.”77
Others, such as Alabama Senator Richard C. Shelby, whose state had the
chief design contract for the Constellation program, called President
Obama’s plans to encourage development of commercial spacecraft “‘a
welfare program for the commercial space industry.’”78 Other members of
Congress have introduced legislation intended to keep the space shuttles
out of retirement.79
[23] However, the commercial space industry has already begun filling
the void left in the wake of President Obama’s announcement to scale
back NASA. In June 2010, Space Exploration Technologies Corporation
(“SpaceX”) launched the first private rocket, which ultimately could take
astronauts into orbit.80 The Falcon 9 rocket, measuring in at 154-feet,
735,000 pounds, burned for nine minutes before reaching its 155 miles
75

Id.

76

Sandra Frederick, Uncertain Launch for Obama’s Space Mission, Critics Hit Change
in Emphasis, THE WASH. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2010, at A3.
77

Letter from Neil Armstrong, Commander, Apollo 11, et al., (Apr. 2010) available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ id/36470363/ns/nightly_news.
78

Kenneth Chang, Obama’s NASA Blueprint Is Challenged in Congress, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 23, 2010, at A16 (quoting Sen. Richard C. Shelby).
79

Id.

80

Kenneth Chang, Private Rocket’s First Flight Is a Success, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2010,
at A11.
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target orbit.81 Despite SpaceX claims that the launch was a success, others
question the effectiveness of using the private sector to develop the
country’s space program.
[24] Texas Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, who represents the homestate of NASA, noted that “‘[e]ven this modest success is more than a year
behind schedule, and the project deadlines of other private space
companies continue to slip as well.’”82 Others urge that the private sector
should serve to supplement NASA’s space flight program and not replace
it entirely.83 Regardless, SpaceX stated that with the aid of a government
contract it would need only three years to develop a Falcon 9 rocket
capable of taking American astronauts into orbit.84
[25] One commentator has recently compared the privatization of the
space industry with the beginnings of the airlines and the enactment of the
Kelly Airmail Act, which gave the U.S. Postal Service the chance to
subcontract mail delivery with commercial airlines.85 The Kelly Airmail
Act, coupled with the measures previously discussed in Part II.A, allowed
the commercial airlines to expand their routes, which helped lead to the
commercial airline system we know today.86 But the underlying problem
remains the same: how to encourage the development of new technologies
intended to expand the potential of the commercial market while ensuring
the safety for all those involved. As stated in a recent edition of
Washington Monthly, “NASA is gambling that private corporations, some
of them as yet untested in spaceflight, can carry astronauts to the space
station more safely than the space shuttle, even as the agency exercises
81

Id.

82

Id. (quoting Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison).

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Charles Homans, The Wealth of Constellations: Can the Free Market Save the Space
Program?, WASH. MONTHLY, May 1, 2010, at 18(9).
86

Id.; see supra Part I.A.
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less safety oversight over them – a plan that runs counter to the
recommendations of every major accident investigation NASA has
conducted.”87 NASA administrator Charles Bolden Jr. has emphasized
that safety remains a priority at NASA and the same safety standards set
forth by NASA itself would apply to the private sector’s attempts to fill
NASA’s needs.88 In response, Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama
claimed, “‘[t]hat’s not the message that’s being received at NASA right
now.’”89
[26] Still, if past attempts by private enterprises to use NASA facilities
can serve as an example, the quest for safety could drive the best of the
private sector out of the public space contracting business.90 Starfighters,
Inc. was the first commercial provider to use the Kennedy Space Center’s
Shuttle Landing Facility in Florida, where it houses four F-104 jets on the
premises.91 The corporation offers the public suborbital flight training and
provides the government with the opportunity to perform microgravity
experiments.92 But Starfighters, Inc. spent two-years before it gained
NASA’s permission to use the facility.93 Corporation President and Chief
Pilot Rick Svetkoff stated, “‘It nearly put us out of business. . . . Going in
as the first, it was extremely difficult. We went through a lot of
hurdles.’”94 Svetkoff believes the reason behind the difficulties lies in

87

Homans, supra note 85.

88

Mary Orndorff, Shelby Confronts NASA Chief on Leadership, BIRMINGHAM NEWS
(ALA.), Apr. 23, 2010, at 3.
89

Id.

90

Wanted: New Partners, FLORIDA TODAY (MELBOURNE, FLA.), Apr. 18, 2010, at E1.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Id. (quoting Rick Svetkoff, President and Chief Pilot, Starfighters, Inc.).
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NASA’s inexperience in dealing with the private market.95 As he stated,
“‘[NASA is] not commercially oriented.”96
[27] Thus, while NASA tries to maintain its commitment to safety
when dealing with the private sector, the mandatory dealing with private
space flight companies of President Obama’s plan might jeopardize
NASA’s safety regulations. Using the airline industry as an example,
NASA’s primary focus on safety will begin to bend in favor of
deregulation and more flexibility in dealings with the commercial market.
Thus, the agency with the expertise and knowledge to properly regulate
the commercial space travel market at this early stage will have to favor
the private market in its dealings. Yet, the airline industry has already
faced this reality, as it routinely deals with the problems associated with
the dual mandate of the FAA and the potential for agency capture.
C. The Current State of Regulation in Commercial Space Travel
and Potential Agency Capture
[28] Court confidence in agency expertise began to waver during the
1960s and 1970s.97 Around the same time, academia identified agency
capture as a cause of the growing skepticism surrounding agency
expertise.98 The theory of agency capture suggests “that agencies go
through a natural ‘life cycle,’” wherein the early phases of an agency’s
existence are “characterized by vigorous and independent regulation, not
unlike the role for agencies imagined by the public interest literature,” but
the later phases are “closely identified with and dependent upon the
industry it is charged with regulating.”99
95

Wanted: New Partners, FLORIDA TODAY (MELBOURNE, FLA.), Apr. 18, 2010, at E1.

96

Id. (quoting Rick Svetkoff, President and Chief Pilot, Starfighters, Inc.).

97

See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1039, 1060 (1997).
98

Id.

99

Id. (citing MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION (1955)).
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[29] The D.C. Circuit addressed this issue in Home Box Office, Inc v.
FCC, in which the court considered ex parte communications between
cable providers and the FCC.100 The court stated:
Although it is impossible to draw any firm
conclusions about the effect of ex parte presentations upon
the ultimate shape of the pay cable rules, the evidence is
certainly consistent with often-voiced claims of undue
industry influence over Commission proceedings, and we
are particularly concerned that the final shaping of the rules
we are reviewing here may have been by compromise
among the contending industry forces, rather than by
exercise of the independent discretion in the public interest
the
Communications
Act
vests
in
individual
101
commissioners.
[30] During the early 1980s, judicial thought shifted from agency
capture toward a new operational method known as the “public choice
theory.”102 This theory is premised on the idea that agencies no longer
operate as instruments of the industries they regulate, rather they act in
their own interests to preserve their continued existence.103 Under either
theory – agency capture or public choice – the agency premises its action
on the survival of the industry it serves. For example, the FAA makes
safety approval determinations related to commercial space travel
according to “performance-based criteria, against which [it] may assess
the effect on public health and safety and on safety of property, in the
following hierarchy: (1) FAA or other appropriate Federal regulations[;]
(2) Government-developed or adopted standards[;] (3) Industry consensus
performance-based criteria or standard[;] (4) Applicant-developed

100

See generally Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

101

Id. at 53.

102

See Merrill, supra note 97, at 1068-69.

103

See id. at 1068-71.
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criteria.”104
The applicant-developed criteria category allows the
manufacturer to define its own performance standards based on four
factors, and is the last category to which the FAA will look.105
[31] The development of the airline industry demonstrates that
deregulation can prove “one of the government’s most successful
economic initiatives.”106 Limited regulation in the early days of
commercial aviation developed the industry into what we know today and,
as discussed earlier, made airlines a realistic mode of transportation for
nearly all American citizens.107 In the realm of space travel, similar limits
on regulation will likely grant companies developing technologies
significant leeway for innovative discovery and manufacturing, while
providing the FAA and AST a final say on safety. This allows the FAA
and AST to meet its dual mandate to:
[E]ncourage private sector launches, reentries, and
associated services and, only to the extent necessary,
regulate those launches, reentries, and services to ensure
compliance with international obligations of the United
States and to protect the public health and safety, safety of
property, and national security and foreign policy interests
of the United States.108
[32] The problem occurs when FAA and AST regulations become a
means by which developing industries push the envelope at the expense of
safety. American University Professor of Law Mark C. Niles considers
this problem in his paper addressing potential agency capture within the

104

14 C.F.R. § 414.19 (2010).

105

See id.

106

See Zuckerman & Wald, supra note 67.

107

See infra Part II.A.

108

49 U.S.C. § 70101(a)(7) (2006).
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FAA leading up to the September 11, 2001 attacks.109 Niles suggests the
FAA suffered from agency capture at the time of the attacks,110 and notes
that the dual mandate to promote aviation and provide for its safety creates
inconsistent goals.111
As another commentator observed, “[t]hese
conflicting purposes are an obvious problem once one realizes that for
every proposed safety regulation, the FAA must weigh the cost of
implementation and determine if it is worth the financial strain on the
airlines.”112 According to Niles, this framework led to individual airlines
implementing passenger safety regulations, rather than airports or the
FAA.113 While Niles does not believe there is enough evidence to show
the FAA has succumbed to agency capture, he concludes “that effective
regulation within the airline industry in promotion of the public interest is
less of a priority for the FAA than ensuring that the industry be provided
with an atmosphere where it can thrive financially.”114 Thus, Niles
believes, “The FAA demonstrates all the signs of an agency that has
allowed private pressure to undermine its public responsibility, and its
regulations are tragically deficient as a result.”115
[33] An analysis of agency capture and any similar acquiescence by the
FAA and AST to the private pressures of the commercial space travel
109

See generally Niles, supra note 63, at 413.

110

Cf. id. at 406 (“[T]he FAA has consistently promoted the interests of the airline
industry at the expense of the broader public interest, including airline safety and
security.”).
111

Id. at 412-16.

112

Lea Ann Carlisle, Comment, The FAA v. the NTSB: Now That Congress Has
Addressed the Federal Aviation Administration’s “Dual Mandate,” Has the FAA Begun
Living up to Its Amended Purpose of Making Air Travel Safer, or Is the National
Transportation Safety Board Still Doing Its Job Alone?, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 741, 741
(2001)); see also Niles, supra note 63, at 413-16.
113

See id. at 426-27 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44903(c)(2)(B) (1994)).

114

Id. at 422.

115

Niles, supra note 63, at 442.
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industry is beyond the scope of this Article. However, it is clear that
giving an industry such a powerful say in regulations affecting the
development of the space travel industry development may result in
disastrous consequences. Importantly, the FAA and the AST have yet to
face these issues in the emerging space flight industry.116 As such, the
FAA and AST have an opportunity to ensure the space flight industry does
not fall into the same passenger safety trap as commercial airlines.117
Time to change these ineffective policies and attitudes runs short,
however, as Virgin Galactic makes plans to begin commercial space
flights within the next year.118 While safety remains a primary concern,
the FAA and AST must also follow their mandate to encourage the
development of this exciting industry,119 which means supporting Virgin
Galactic’s efforts to launch its services in 2011.120
[34] One way to deal with the inherent conflict between safety
regulation and industry development involves the FAA and AST working
with the commercial space industry to reach a solution at the onset of the
industry. But this solution provides a less than satisfactory guarantee of
safety to passengers who rely on the FAA and AST’s mandate “to protect .
. . public health and safety.”121 Furthermore, such a solution makes it
harder for passengers to bring a claim against providers like Virgin

116

Cf. Cheryl Pellerin, U.S. Agencies, Companies Work to Commercialize Space Travel,
Business Growing for Spaceports, Commercial Launches, Space Station Flights,
AMERICA.GOV (May 29, 2009), http://www.america.gov/st/scitech-english/2009/
May/20090529163746lcnirellep0.2032587.html (discussing the recent evolution of the
industry and acknowledging that the AST has issued just 196 licenses for launch since the
office’s inception more than 20 years ago).
117

See generally Niles, supra note 63, at 413.

118

See Norris, supra note 3.

119

See 49 U.S.C. § 70101(a)(7) (2006);

120

Norris, supra note 3.

121

See 49 U.S.C. § 70101(a)(7) (2006); Pellerin, supra note 114 (noting that the AST
must seek “to ensure public safety during commercial launch and re-entry activities.”).
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Galactic if something goes wrong.122 In essence, giving the commercial
space flight industry the ability to regulate itself means consumers will
have a difficult road making claims against operators in the industry.
Under these circumstances, the commercial space flight industry has no
incentive to maintain safety from the outset or, for that matter, in the
future.
[35] Thus, Congress and the courts must ensure the safety of the
passengers from the outset of this industry and prevent the FAA and AST
from falling victim to agency capture through the creation of a legal
regime, a concept that is not new, to deal with extraordinary
circumstances.123 Consider the establishment of maritime law and the
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.124 The act stated that
the provided remedies “shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability
of such employer to the employee,”125 and intended to provide uniformity
regarding incidents on the many different state shores across the
country.126 Accordingly, the law applies uniformly across state and federal
courts.127
[36] The United States Supreme Court holds that if a plaintiff
experiences an injury on board a ship in navigable waters, “[t]he legal
rights and liabilities arising from that conduct [are] within the full reach of
the admiralty jurisdiction and [measured] by the standards of [federal]

122

See discussion infra Parts III-V.

123

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

124

Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 69-803, 44 Stat. 1424
(1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (2006)).
125

33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (2006).

126

See Hetzel v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50 F.3d 360, 364 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing S. Pac.
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917)).
127

See, e.g., id. (citing State Indus. Comm’n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263, 274-76
(1922)).
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maritime law.”128 The Court applies this “‘reverse-Erie’ doctrine” to
personal maritime actions.129 As such, while state courts may still hear
these cases, they must apply federal law.130
[37] The Court should apply a similar doctrine to the commercial space
travel industry. Such a doctrine would ensure uniformity on an issue that
spans around the globe. Furthermore, because the United States will soon
face liability for spaceships taking off from its soil, liability in space travel
will be a federal issue with state common law themes.131 To ensure
uniformity, Congress must devise an acceptable liability scheme before
allowing spaceships to take flight. To accomplish this goal, the United
States should adopt a solution similar to the novel approach Pennsylvania
courts use in products liability law as applied to amusement park
operators.132 The need to implement this solution becomes apparent after
considering alternative methods for bringing claims against companies
such as Virgin Galactic.
III. THEORIES OF LIABILITY BASED ON INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
A. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon, and Other Celestial Bodies
[38] The United States and eighty-three other countries entered into a
treaty concerning space travel less than two years before Neil Armstrong

128

Kermarec v. Compagnie, 358 U.S. 625, 628 (1959).

129

Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 223 (1986) (citing William F. Baxter,
Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 34 (1963)).
130

See Kermarec, 358 U.S. at 628.

131

See infra Part III.
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See infra Part VI. See generally Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 372 A.2d 736,
739 (Pa. 1977).
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walked on the moon in July 1969.133 The rationale behind the treaty was
to “reduce the danger of conflict in space.”134 As the Secretary-General of
the United Nations stated in a message directed to the major superpowers,
“[a]s man ventures into space, he cannot rely solely on his scientific and
technological knowledge, great as it may be. He must equally depend on
legally binding universal standards of conduct, progressively developed as
science unravels the mysteries of space.”135
[39] The Treaty does not deal solely with military issues, but also
assesses liability on an international scale for all objects launched into
space.136 In particular, article VII states:
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or
procures the launching of an object into outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, and each
State Party from whose territory or facility an object is
launched, is internationally liable for damage to another
State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical
persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth,
in air space or in outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies.137
133

See generally Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 (entered into force Oct. 27, 1967)
[hereinafter Treaty]; Press Release, Secretary-General, Message Sent to President
Lyndon B. Johnson, Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin, and Prime Minister Harold Wilson on
the Occasion of the Signing of the Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Other Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/646 (Jan. 27, 1967), reprinted in 7 PUBLIC PAPERS OF
THE SECRETARIES-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1965-1967, at 374 (Andrew W.
Cordier & Max Harrelson eds., 1976) [hereinafter Message].
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See Message, supra note 133, at 375.
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See generally Treaty, supra note 133, at art. VIII.
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Id. at art. VII.
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[40] As such, under this treaty, the United States faces potential liability
for anything that goes wrong with a commercial space flight taking off
from United States territory. This not only includes falling pieces of
debris landing in foreign countries, but injury to foreign nationals resulting
from the spacecraft’s presence in air space or outer space.138 The potential
for such liability has led to the requirement that operations must buy $500
million in third-party liability insurance with the government responsible
for up to $1.5 billion for remaining damages.139
[41] Notably, the Treaty further mandates that “[a] State Party to the
Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried
shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any
personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body.”140 As a
result, the D.C. Circuit Court recognized that, while the Treaty does not
expressly address tort claims, “the basic principle is that in the
sovereignless reaches of outer space, each state party to the treaty will
retain jurisdiction over its own objects and persons.”141 Thus, United
States law controls issues of liability for accidents occurring during space
flights from the United States, including Virgin Galactic flights from
Spaceport America. This empowers Congress and the courts to ensure the
liability standards for commercial space travel remain fair and equitable.
B. The Warsaw Convention, Montreal Accord, and Montreal Protocols
[42] Under the Warsaw Convention the international community agreed
to regulate “all international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods
138

Id.

139

See Ryabinkin, supra note 37, at 120.

140

Treaty, supra note 133, at art. VIII.

141

Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Treaty, supra note
131, at art. VIII). The Tax Court also acknowledged in dicta that no state has sovereignty
over outer space. See Rogers v. Comm’r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1573, 1573 n.13 (T.C. 2009).
The court noted, “[I]ncome earned in outer space would not be considered foreign earned
income. . . . For Federal income tax purposes, income earned in outer space would be
treated just like income earned in international waters or in international airspace.” Id.
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performed by aircraft for hire.”142 The Warsaw Convention, as modified
by the Montreal Accord of 1966 and the Montreal Protocols,143 governs
the scope of air carrier liability for injuries to passengers or damage to
luggage.144 The original language of the Warsaw Convention caps the
liability of an air carrier, which the Montreal Accord set at $75,000,145
unless “the damage is caused by [its] wilful [sic] misconduct or by such
default on [its] part as, in accordance with the law of the Court to which
the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilful [sic]
misconduct.”146 In light of the liability cap, the necessary standard to
circumvent the cap and the overall forgiving nature of the Warsaw
Convention, it is apparent that “the Warsaw Convention and initial lack of
domestic regulation provided the U.S. airline industry with the
combination of protection and freedom it needed to flourish.”147 However,
does the Warsaw Convention provide the appropriate liability scheme for

142

See generally Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air art. 1, § 1, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876
[hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
143

See Liability Limitations of Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol, Order
Approving Agreement, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302, 7302 (May 19, 1966); Additional Protocol
No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air, Sept. 25, 1975, 2145 U.N.T.S. 36 [hereinafter Montreal
Protocol No. 4]; LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED:
A LEGAL HANDBOOK 7-8 (2000). The Warsaw Convention was also modified by other
international agreements, such as the Hague Protocol (1955), which the United States
never ratified, but subsequently adopted after agreeing to the Montreal Protocol No. 4,
and the Guatemala City Protocol (1971). See GOLDHIRSCH at 6.
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See generally Warsaw Convention, supra note 142.
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See Liability Limitations of Warsaw Convention, supra note 143; Byrd v. Comair, Inc.
(In re air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006), 501 F. Supp. 2d 902, 908-13 (E.D.
Ky. 2007) (citing In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scot. On Dec. 21, 1988), 928 F.2d
1267, 1270 n.2 (2d Cir. 1991).
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Warsaw Convention, supra note 142, at ch. 25; see also El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v.
Tseng, 525 U.S. 151, 166-67 (1999)).
147

Ryabinkin, supra note 38, at 105.
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the commercial space flight industry?148 Proper evaluation of this question
begins with an analysis of the language governing the scope of the
Warsaw Convention.
[43] Chapter I of the Warsaw Convention states, “[t]his convention shall
apply to all international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods
performed by aircraft for hire. It shall apply equally to gratuitous
transportation by aircraft performed by an air transportation enterprise.”149
The United States Code defines the term “aircraft” as “any contrivance
invented, used, or designed to navigate, or fly in, the air.”150 Utilizing this
broad definition of “aircraft,” it appears the Warsaw Convention may
apply to incidents arising from commercial space travel. After all,
spaceships like SpaceShipTwo and WhiteKnightTwo “navigate, or fly in,
the air,” and therefore fit the Code’s definition of “aircraft.”151 But it is the
definition of “launch vehicle” – “a vehicle built to operate in, or place a
payload or human beings in, outer space; and . . . a suborbital rocket,” that
applies more directly to crafts such as SpaceShipTwo and
WhiteKnightTwo.152 Therefore, a court is more likely to classify
SpaceShipTwo and WhiteKnightTwo as “launch vehicles,” rather than
“aircraft[s].”
[44] The text of the Warsaw Convention considered the idea of
“experimental trial” aircraft.153 In doing so, it stated:

148

At least one commentator chose not to apply the Warsaw Convention liability scheme
to commercial space travel. See generally Ryabinkin, supra note 38, at 106-07.
149

Warsaw Convention, supra note 142, at art. 1.

150

49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(6) (2006). It is of note that the United States adopted this
definition well before the enactment of the Warsaw Convention. See generally id.
151

See id; Norris, supra note 3.

152

Id. § 70102(8)(A)-(B) (2006).

153

See Warsaw Convention, supra note 142, at art. 34.
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This convention shall not apply to international
transportation by air performed by way of experimental
trial by air navigation enterprises with the view to the
establishment of regular lines of air navigation, nor shall it
apply to transportation performed in extraordinary
circumstances outside the normal scope of an air carrier’s
business.154
[45] Although it is unlikely the signatory nations considered
commercialized space travel, Virgin Galactic’s WhiteKnightTwo and
SpaceShipTwo might fall under the Convention’s definition of
experimental trial.155 If so, other commercial space travel operations could
arguably fit as well, and regardless of the signatories’ actual intent, a court
would likely characterize the commercial space industry as
“experimental.”156 If courts draw this conclusion, industry participants,
from passengers to carriers, face potentially limitless liability since the
Convention would not apply in a commercial space industry case.157
Therefore, Congress must adopt the Francioni products liability scheme.158
IV. NEGLIGENCE – WHAT IS THE DUTY? WHERE’S THE CAUSE?
[46] Since negligence is primarily a state law concept, negligence
claims brought in federal courts are generally adjudicated under state
law.159 Thus, while the Warsaw Convention gives the federal judiciary
154

Id.

155

See Warsaw Convention, supra note 142, at art. 34

156

“Experimental” means “pertaining to, derived from or founded on experiment.”
RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 681 (2d ed. 1993). “Experiment” means “a
test, trial, or tentative procedure; an act or operation for the purpose of discovering
something unknown.” Id.
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jurisdiction,160 the Erie doctrine requires that the federal courts apply the
appropriate state law concerning common law negligence.161 But the Erie
doctrine’s restriction on federal courts does not apply “in matters governed
by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress.”162 As a result,
federal common law still exists today.163 Congress should act now to
define a workable liability scheme that ensures uniformity for space travel
liability issues before the fifty states set up their own regimes.
[47] As previously stated, the federal courts could impose a “reverseErie” doctrine allowing the cases to go forward in state courts, which
arguably are better suited to handle this style of case, while Congress and
the federal courts establish the law in light of its national and international
implications. Given the law’s present state, this Article looks to New
Mexico law, since it appears this state will be the first to deal with these
extraordinary concepts.
[48] New Mexico law specifically allows a plaintiff to bring a design
defect claim in both strict liability and negligence.164 The New Mexico
Supreme Court has established the elements of negligence as follows:
Generally, a negligence claim requires the existence
of a duty from a defendant to a plaintiff, breach of that
duty, which is typically based upon a standard of
reasonable care, and the breach being a proximate cause
and cause in fact of the plaintiff’s damages. ‘In New
160

See 28 U.S.C. §1331 (2006).

161

See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 229 (1996) (“Articles 17 and
24(2) provide nothing more than a pass-through, authorizing us to apply the law that
would govern in absence of the Warsaw Convention.”).
162

See id.

163

See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (“In absence of an
applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law
according to their own standards.”).
164

Brooks v. Beech aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 56 (N.M. 1995).
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Mexico, negligence encompasses the concepts of
foreseeability of harm to the person injured and of a duty of
care toward that person.’165
[49] The court has held that while negligence is a question of fact for
the jury, “a finding of negligence . . . is dependent upon the existence of a
duty on the part of the defendant.”166 The existence of a duty is a question
of law determined by the court.167 Since a plaintiff will likely have little
problem showing damages in a matter concerning a spaceship accident,
but will face difficulty proving a duty exists in the first place and the
breach caused the injuries, this Article will focus solely on duty and
breach under New Mexico law.
A. Duty
[50] The question of duty in a negligent design of a defective product
case is “a function of conscious choice, [because] design is conduct
dependant.”168 As a result, a court’s determination on whether a duty
exists to design and manufacture a non-defective spaceship will look to
the designer’s actions and its knowledge at the time of design and
production. To determine whether a duty exists, the New Mexico
Supreme Court analyzes both foreseeability and policy before deciding
whether the plaintiff owed a duty to the defendant.169

165

Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 73 P.3d 181, 185-86 (N.M. 2003) (quoting Ramirez v.
Armstrong, 673 P.2d 822, 825 (N.M. 1983)).
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Id. at 186 (quoting Schear v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 687 P.2d 728, 729 (N.M. 1984)).
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20 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).
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1. Foreseeability
[51] When evaluating foreseeability, New Mexico courts ask “whether
the defendant's conduct foreseeably created a broader ‘zone of risk’ that
poses a general threat of harm to others.”170 This analysis differs from the
causation prong. Foreseeability serves as a minimum threshold while the
causation prong requires a much higher factual showing.171 A plaintiff
involved in a tragic accident would not have a hard time proving the
foreseeability prong of the duty analysis. Thus, spaceship operators, like
Virgin Galactic, and spaceship manufacturers, like The Spaceship
Company,172 may, under this analysis, create a larger “zone of risk” posing
a general threat of harm to others.
[52] In response, a defendant could argue the danger was “open and
obvious” thus limiting the “zone of risk.”173 The defendant could argue
the plaintiff assumed an extremely broad “zone of risk” involved with
climbing on-board experimental spaceships holding thousands of gallons
of rocket-fuel. As a result, the “zone of risk” associated with such
operations could not expand based on the defendant’s conduct.

170

Herrera, 73 P.3d at 185-86 (quoting McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 953 So.2d 500, 502
(Fla. 1992)); see also Calkins v. Cox Estates, 792 P.2d 36, 38 (N.M. 1990) (“[I]n
determining duty, it must be determined that the injured party was a foreseeable plaintiff
– that he was within the zone of danger created by respondent's actions . . . .”).
171

See infra note 195 and accompanying text.

172

About, THE SPACESHIP COMPANY, available at http://www.thespaceshipcompany.com/
About.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2010) (noting that “The Spaceship Company[] is a new
aerospace production company, founded by Sir Richard Branson’s Virgin Group and
Scaled Composites, which will be building the world’s first fleet of commercial
spaceships . . . .[The Spaceschip Company] has contracted Scaled Composites to develop
and build prototypes of [WhiteKnightTwo] and [SpaceShipTwo].”).
173

Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 824 P.2d 293, 295-97 (N.M. 1992) (rejecting the “open
and obvious” rule, which holds that there is no duty where the danger is reasonably
known to others).
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[53] While some jurisdictions recognize the “open and obvious”
doctrine as a defense,174 the New Mexico Supreme Court firmly rejects
it.175 In dealing with slip-and-fall cases, the court held “an owner or
occupier of a premises cannot avoid liability for injuries that are obvious,
abolishing the doctrine that landowners incur no liability for hazards that
are open and obvious.”176 Without “open and obvious” as a defense, the
obligation of operators and manufacturers like Virgin Galactic and The
Spaceship Company to build and design spaceships without defects passes
the foreseeability prong, making this obligation a duty.
2. Public Policy
[54] When performing this analysis, the New Mexico Supreme Court
first looks to whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a statutory duty.177
As stated by the court, “‘[w]ith deference always to constitutional
principles, it is the particular domain of the [L]egislature, as the voice of
the people, to make public policy.’”178 For this reason, demonstrating a
statutory duty may prove difficult for potential plaintiffs.
[55] The New Mexico legislature introduced a bill in 2009 that would
grant conditional liability immunity for commercial space travel providers
against “the inherent risks of space flight activities.”179 Incidentally, New
Mexico is not alone in this view. In 2007, Virginia became the first state
in the United States to enact legislation providing conditional immunity to

174

See, e.g., Michalski v. Home Depot, Inc., 225 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2000); Theriot v.
Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 536 (5th Cir. 1986); McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic
Corp., No. 03:96-CV-538RP, 1997 WL 873829, at*10 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 10, 1997).
175

See Benavidez v. City of Gallup, 161 P.3d 853, 859 (N.M. 2007).

176

Id. (citing Klopp, 824 P.2d at 297).

177

See Herrera, 73 P.3d at 187.

178

Id. (quoting Torres v. State, 894 P.2d 386, 389 (N.M. 1995)).

179

S.B. 37, 49th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2009).
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commercial space flight providers.180 Florida followed suit the next year,
adopting the Spaceflight Informed Consent Act of 2008.181
[56] The Space Flight Liability and Immunity Act bounced around from
the Senate Committee on Public Affairs to the Senate Committee on
Judiciary and back to the Senate Committee on Public Affairs before
passing the committee with no recommendation.182 Still, the act sets forth
the basic policies put before the Senate Floor of the New Mexico
legislature. These policies acknowledge:
A. . . . New Mexico and its residents will gain significant
economic and personal benefits from the development of a
successful and robust commercial human space flight
industry, while playing a significant role in its growth. The
development of the spaceport will create jobs and have a
positive effect on the state’s tax base; [and]
B. [C]ommercial human space flight activities involve
inherent risks that cannot be eliminated or controlled
through the exercise of reasonable care and that justify the
exculpation of ordinary negligence, and that these inherent
risks provide the challenge and excitement that entice space
flight participants to participate in these activities . . . .183
The Space Flight Liability and Immunity Act, then, would relieve the
commercial space flight provider of liability, provided it acquires the
passenger’s informed consent and does not commit “an act or omission

180

See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-227.8-.10 (2009); Mineiro, supra note 134, at 382 (citing
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-227.8-.10 (2009)).
181

See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 331.401 (West 2009); Mineiro, supra note 134, at 382 (citing
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 331.401 (West 2009)).
182

See Bill Tracking Report, S.B. 37, 49th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2009), available at
http://www.westlaw.com/ (search “Find this document by citation” for “2009 NM S.B.
37 (NS)”; then follow any of the hyperlinks returned).
183

S.B. 37, 49th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2009).
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that constitutes gross negligence evidencing willful or wanton disregard
for the safety of a participant . . . or intentionally causes an injury.”184
[57] While the act does not represent the law of New Mexico, it
demonstrates the potential future state policy in light of the amount of
economic incentives given to Spaceport America, which is located near
the White Sands Missile Range in Southeast New Mexico.185 The
Spaceport Authority expects to complete construction of hangars, a
terminal, and a 10,000-foot runway in 2010.186 Because such projects are
not cheap, in terms of money or state economic incentives, in 2006 the
New Mexico legislature passed the Regional Spaceport District Act to
provide economic incentives attracting Virgin Galactic and the developers
of Spaceport America to the desert of Southern New Mexico.187
[58] The mission will require $198 million from taxpayers, $56 million
of which will come from gross receipts tax increases in two neighboring
counties over the next ten years.188 To account for this the New Mexico
Legislature placed three conditions upon the release of any state funding
for the Spaceport America project.189 First, the entire cost of the project
must remain below $225 million.190 Second, the Authority must secure an
anchor tenant at Spaceport America.191 Third, the Authority must obtain a
signed launch license from the FAA.192 The final pieces of the puzzle
184

Id.

185

See Rene Romo, Spaceport Gets Its License to Launch: FAA Approval Clears Way for
Construction to Begin, ALBUQUERQUE J., at C1.
186

Id.

187

See generally H.B. 473, 47th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2006).

188

Romo, supra note 185.

189

Id.

190

See id.

191

See id.

192

See id.
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came together between late 2008 and early 2009 when Spaceport America
obtained a license and Virgin Galactic signed a twenty-year lease with the
state to use Spaceport America.193 The project broke ground in June of
2009 and is now underway.194
[59] The policy behind all of this is clear. In much the same way that
the dual mandate of the FAA and AST appear to conflict with safety, it
seems apparent that New Mexico’s investment into Spaceport America
could conflict with Virgin Galactic and The Spaceship Company’s duty to
manufacture a safe product, especially with the amount of deference given
to the legislature as policy setters. While this issue could go either way, it
exposes the tenuous position facing plaintiffs when bringing negligence
claims. These problems only intensify when considering the burden the
plaintiff must meet to satisfy the causation element.
B. Proximate Cause
[60] The New Mexico Supreme Court defines proximate cause as “that
which in a natural and continuous sequence [unbroken by an independent
intervening cause] produces the injury, and without which the injury
would not have occurred.”195 A plaintiff’s case moves forward if a
rational jury concludes that a breach of the duty established under the
above analysis caused the plaintiff’s injuries.196 The main difficulty for a
plaintiff’s case, in the context of commercial space travel, surrounds the
investigation of accidents involving spacecrafts. Typically, little, if
anything, will remain after these accidents due to explosions or
disintegrations upon re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere, as witnessed in
the Challenger explosion in 1986 and Columbia’s disintegration during re-

193

See Diana M. Alba, Spaceport To Break Ground, ALAMOGORDO DAILY NEWS (New
Mexico), June 19, 2009, at NEWS.
194

See id.

195

Herrera, 73 P.3d at 195 (citing Uniform Jury Instructions, 13-305 NMRA 2003).

196

See id.
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entry in 2003.197 While NASA possesses the resources to look into these
issues, a typical plaintiff likely does not possess the financial means or
scientific expertise to develop the evidence for the causation element.
[61] But all is not lost for the plaintiff. New Mexico law allows the
plaintiff, in the absence of proof of specific negligent acts, to make a
prima facie case of negligence based on a res ipsa loquitor theory.198 To
prove negligence through res ipsa loquitor, a plaintiff generally must
show: “(1) that the accident be of the kind which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; [and] (2) that it must be
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control and
management of defendant.”199 With respect to claims stemming from
commercial space travel, assuming a plaintiff would experience little
difficulty showing accidents such as explosions or disintegrations would
not have occurred absent manufacturer negligence, he may find it difficult
to prove the defendant’s exclusive control and management of the
spacecraft. For example, a plaintiff would have a hard time showing The
Spaceship Company has exclusive control of the spaceships because
Virgin Galactic operates the crafts.200 Conversely, it would be quite
difficult to prove Virgin Galactic maintained exclusive control and
management of spaceship operations because The Spaceship Company
manufactures the vessels. As such, plaintiffs suing commercial space
travel providers under a negligence theory in New Mexico state court must
not only overcome the burden of proving a statutory duty, but the burden
of proving the control and management element of res ipsa loquitor.
197

See John Noble Wilford, With Fear and Wonder in Its Wake, Sputnik Lifted Us Into
the Future, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2007, at F2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/09/25/science/space/25sput.html; see also infra Part IV.C (discussing the efforts
that went into finding the cause of the Columbia disaster).
198

See Tafoya v. Las Cruces Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 278 P.2d 575, 577 (N.M. 1955).

199

Renfro v. J.D. Coggins Co., 378 P.2d 130, 134 (N.M. 1963) (citing Tafoya, 278 P.2d
at 577).
200

See Eric Gershon, Pratt to Power Civilian Spaceship Jet Engine Picked for Launch
Aircraft, Hartford Courant, July 12, 2007, at E1 (“Virgin Galactic will own and operate
the aircraft.”).
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V. THE DIFFICULTIES IN PROVING STRICT LIABILITY
[62] Unfortunately, application of a strict liability theory does not make
the road to recovery any easier. The New Mexico Supreme Court
distinguishes strict liability and negligence as such: “Negligence focuses
on conduct. Strict liability focuses on the product.”201 As a result, New
Mexico courts distinguish between claims based on a product and claims
based on a service,202 and have held that “negligent services may trigger
ordinary negligence, malpractice or breach of contract actions, but [they
do] not form the basis for actions in strict liability.”203 This holding
follows the majority rule for applying strict liability as recognized in other
jurisdictions.204 Analogizing the initial commercial space travel flights to
amusement park rides demonstrates the difficulties associated with
bringing a products liability claim.
[63] Applying this analogy, New Mexico would likely follow the
majority of jurisdictions, holding commercial space travel “providers” as
merely “provid[ing] persons with a service; namely a ride on a
machine.”205 As a result, companies like Virgin Galactic and other
providers of space “rides” would not face strict liability for a defective
product.

201

Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 60 (N.M. 1995) (emphasis in original).

202

See, e.g., Trujillo v. Berry, 738 P.2d 1331, 1334 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987).

203

Id.

204

See, e.g., Siciliano v. Capitol City Shows, Inc., 475 A.2d 19, 25 (N.H. 1984).

205

See id.; see also Fellner v. Phila. Togboggan Coasters, Inc., No. 3:05-cv-218-SEBWGH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53652, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 2, 2006) (citing Marsh v.
Dixon, 707 N.E.2d 998, 1001-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)); Sells v. Six Flags Over Tex., Inc.,
No. 3:96-CV-1574-D, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23747, at *8-9 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 1997);
Marsh, 707 N.E.2d at 1001-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
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[64] Under this legal framework the plaintiff could sue the
manufacturer of the defective product, but not the provider of a service
using the defective product.206 The New Mexico Supreme Court explains:
The policy underpinnings supporting imposition of strict
liability on product manufacturers and suppliers include (1)
ensuring that the risk of loss for injury resulting from
defective products is borne by the suppliers, principally
because they are in a position to absorb the loss by
distributing it as a cost of doing business; (2) encouraging
suppliers to select reputable and responsible manufacturers
who generally design and construct safe products and who
generally accept financial responsibility for injuries caused
by their defective products ; and (3) promoting fairness by
ensuring that plaintiffs injured by an unreasonably
dangerous product are compensated for their injuries.207
This leaves plaintiffs with the daunting task of proving the spaceship’s
faulty design to maintain an action against the manufacturer for strict
products liability.
[65] Proper distribution of the costs of operating business is a driving
force behind the rule of products liability.208 In essence, products liability
acts as a form of insurance.209 Manufacturers make their products
understanding the possibility of defects and that no product is perfect.210
As a result, the manufacturer increases the price of the product to pay for
the product liability costs of inevitable accidents.211 The New Mexico
206

See Trujillo, 738 P.2d at 1334.

207

Smith ex rel. Smith v. Bryco Arms, 33 P.3d 638, 644 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (citing
Brooks, 902 P.2d at 57-58).
208

Brooks, 902 P.2d at 60.

209

See id.

210

See id.

211

See id.
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Supreme Court recognized this cost-spreading rationale as a basis for
adopting strict product liability for defective design, holding that “[a]s
long as the price of a defective product line or successive product lines
reflect some element of injury costs, the policy goal of cost distribution
has been served.”212 While the New Mexico courts have yet to finely
articulate the elements of a defective design claim, other states have
defined the elements.213
[66]

The Florida Supreme Court has held that:
In order to hold a manufacturer liable on the theory of strict
liability in tort, the user must establish [1] the
manufacturer’s relationship to the product in question, [2]
the defect and unreasonably dangerous condition of the
product, and [3] the existence of the proximate causal
connection between such condition and the user’s injuries
or damages.214

These elements appear in line with the strict liability policies embraced by
the New Mexico Supreme Court, and are therefore applied for the
purposes of this Article’s strict liability analysis, which uses the
relationship between Virgin Galactic and The Spaceship Company as an
example.

212

Id.

213

See infra note 214 and accompanying text.

214

West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 87 (Fla. 1976); see also Smith v.
Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954, 958 (Mass. 1978) (listing the elements necessary under
Massachusetts law for showing a design defect); Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869
P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1993) (listing the elements necessary under Utah law for applying
strict product liability to a defective product).
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A. The Manufacturer’s Relationship to the Product in Question
[67] A plaintiff’s biggest problem in a potential suit against Virgin
Galactic and The Spaceship Company lies in demonstrating individual
manufacturer liability. The company closest to becoming the first to
provide spaceflight service, in this case Virgin Galactic, operates more or
less as both service provider and manufacturer of spaceships putting
tourists in orbit, because the majority owner of Virgin Galactic holds a
majority share in The Spaceship Company, which currently makes
SpaceShipTwo and WhiteKnightTwo exclusively for Virgin Galactic.215
[68] In Rodriguez v. Riddell Sports, Inc., the Fifth Circuit addressed the
difficulty of holding a product’s manufacturer liable when its parent
company provides a service related to the product at issue.216 In
Rodriguez, the manufacturer of a football helmet did not include a new,
safer type of foam inside the helmet.217 The company responsible for
reconditioning the helmet, which was part of the same parent company as
the manufacturer, also did not include the new foam.218 The plaintiff wore
one of these helmets during a football game, and upon making his last
tackle, he suffered an irreparable brain injury leaving him in a vegetative
state.219 The injured wearer and his mother subsequently sued the helmet
manufacturer and its related companies.220
[69] The Fifth Circuit held that the company reconditioning the helmet
provided a service and could not face strict liability unless it maintained
control equating to the role of manufacturer.221 The court also noted that
215

See id.

216

See Rodriguez v. Riddell Sports, Inc., 242 F.3d 567, 571 (5th Cir. 2001).

217

See id.

218

See id.

219

Id.

220

See id.

221

See Rodriguez, 242 F.3d at 576.
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the safer alternative, in this case the new foam, did not exist until well
after the manufacturer made the helmet.222 Furthermore, it stated, “if
combining two corporations into one is necessary to apply a strict liability
standard, then plaintiffs must prove that the corporations should be
combined . . . .”223 Thus, the plaintiff would have to pierce the corporate
veil, an extremely unlikely proposition, before combining the defendants
for purposes of applying strict liability to both the manufacturer and the
provider.224 The Fifth Circuit found that the lower court could not
combine the defendants for purposes of litigation.225
[70] The plaintiff in any accident involving a trip aboard Virgin
Galactic will face similar problems to those faced by the plaintiff in
Rodriguez. The Spaceship Company manufactures the spaceship serviced
and operated by Virgin Galactic. If new safety technology is developed
after The Spaceship Company delivers the spaceships to Virgin Galactic
and the spaceships are not upgraded, the plaintiff likely cannot combine
the two obviously related companies in a lawsuit unless it can convince
the court to pierce the corporate veil. Rodriguez exemplifies the difficulty
of such a task. Furthermore, the plaintiff cannot allege strict liability
against Virgin Galactic for the product defect since it was not the
manufacturer and it did not sell the product specifically to the plaintiff.226

222

Id. at 574-75.

223

Id. at 573.

224

See id. Courts apply corporate veil doctrine less than half the time. See Robert B.
Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036,
1048 (1991) (“Courts pierced the veil in about 40% of reported cases.”).
225

See Rodriguez, 242 F.3d. at 573, 577.

226

See supra IV.B (discussing proximate cause).
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B. The Defect and Unreasonably Dangerous Condition of the Product
[71] New Mexico law also requires a determination of whether a
product is unreasonably dangerous.227 Courts use an “unreasonable risk of
injury test” to determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous.228
“An unreasonable risk of injury is a risk which a reasonably prudent
person having full knowledge of the risk would find unacceptable.”229 But
presence of high risk is not dispositive of liability, as the jury must also
calculate “whether the risk can be eliminated without seriously impairing
the usefulness of the product or making it unduly expensive.”230 Jury
instructions further emphasize this point because they “encourage a riskbenefit calculation by defining ‘unreasonable risk of injury’ in a way
which requires the jury to balance meritorious choices for safety made by
the manufacturer while minimizing the risk that the public will be
deprived needlessly of beneficial products.”231
[72] The spaceships made by The Spaceship Company present unique
difficulties in applying the risk-benefit calculation.232
Costs of
manufacturing and maintaining the spaceships could easily skyrocket,
driving down the risk-benefit calculation, and weakening the case that the
product was unreasonably dangerous. Furthermore, additional costs
associated with part repair or redesign could price the ships out of the
market, especially considering each voyage already costs around
$200,000.233 While Virgin Galactic plans to bring launch frequencies up
227

Smith v. Bryco Arms, 33 P.3d 638, 644 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).

228

Id. (citing Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 61 (N.M. 1995).

229

Id. (citations omitted).

230

See id. (citing Brooks, 902 P.2d at 61-63).

231

Id. (citations omitted).

232

See generally Smith, 33 P.3d 638.

233

See generally Norris, supra note 3 (discussing the high cost of flights of Virgin
Galactic’s spaceships).
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and costs down,234 these changes will depend upon how soon voyages
begin running.
[73] Personal interests of New Mexico residents in the spaceship launch
may also influence juror risk-benefit analysis. As previously stated, at
least 350 people have already invested nearly $40 million in deposits.235
Virgin Galactic has also promised a free voyage annually (a $200,000
value) for one local resident from each county that approved taxes for the
construction of Spaceport America.236 Additionally, a New Mexico State
University Report conservatively estimates the economic impact of these
commercial space travel activities will be “$991.45 million, generating
$296.62 million in earnings, and sustaining 2,284 jobs per year by the fifth
year [of operation],” indicating meaningful economic revitalization for the
state.237 This money becomes even more important in a “state [facing a
budget] shortfall of up to $500 million due to declining oil and natural gas
tax revenue and a slowdown in consumer spending.”238 While these
figures do not deal directly with the cost of designing a product not
unreasonably dangerous, the numbers show that a significant amount of
money is tied to the successful launch and longevity of the program.
Needless to say, New Mexico has a stake in ensuring the program is a
success. As such, New Mexico jurors utilizing this risk-benefit balancing
test could find it very difficult to overlook its overall benefit to the
community.239
234

235

See id.
See Park Avenue Travel, supra note 19.

236

See Diana M. Alba, Virgin Galactic Sweetens Spaceport Deal Ahead of Tax Vote, LAS
CRUCES SUN-NEWS (New Mexico), Apr. 17, 2008, at NEWS.
237

See ARROWHEAD CTR., N.M. STATE UNIV., BUSINESS PLAN FOR THE SOUTHWEST
REGIONAL SPACEPORT 1 (2006), available at http://www.spaceportamerica.com/
images/pdf/NMSU_Report.pdf.
238

See Quigley Winthrop, PRIVATE SECTOR’S NEW CHAMPION; Governor Takes
Businessfriendly Record to Bigger Stage, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 7, 2008, at A1.
239

See Smith, 33 P.3d at 644 (explaining how jurors balance the public’s choices for
safety while minimizing the risk of depriving individuals from beneficial products).
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[74] Courts in other jurisdictions will allow the trier of fact to consider
compliance with regulation standards in products liability cases, including
those involving an airplane’s compliance with FAA standards.240 While
FAA compliance does not provide a complete defense, “in a field as
closely regulated as aircraft design and manufacture, it is proper to take
into consideration . . . the fact that the regulatory agency has approved the
very design of which they complain after considering the dangers
involved.”241
[75] The problem arises because the FAA has yet to determine precisely
what type of safety restrictions apply to this new type of vehicle.242
Creating further confusion is the fact that regulations specifically allow the
FAA to consider suggestions from the manufacturer of the vehicle on
allowable parameters for performance and safety.243 In essence, the
company developing the spaceship itself can define what classifies as a
“defect.”244
[76] As a result, the plaintiff will face extreme difficulties
demonstrating the product as unreasonably dangerous under either theory.
The cost of making the perfect spaceship at this late stage and the fact that
the first trip into orbit only years away will prove too high for a jury
required to balance economics and safety. Moreover, the industry’s ability
to set its own standards under FAA regulation will only further weaken
potential product liability claims raised against The Spaceship
Company.245

240

See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Or. 1978).

241

See id.

242

See supra Parts II.A-B.

243

See 14 C.F.R. § 414.19(a)(4) (2006) (identifying applicant-developed criteria as a
factor the FAA may assess to determine whether to approve a safety feature).
244

See id. § 414.19(a)(4).

245

See id.
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C. The Proximate Causal Connection
[77] The burden to demonstrate a defective product caused the injury is
another challenge plaintiffs face in products liability suits. The magnitude
of this difficulty becomes clear in light of the seven-month long
investigation that followed the 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia disaster.246
Over the course of this investigation more than 120 staff members and 400
NASA engineers deposed countless experts and reviewed more than
30,000 documents, and more than 25,000 searchers collected spacecraft
debris from across the Western United States.247 According to the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (“Board”), “[b]ecause the events
that initiated the accident were not apparent for some time, the
investigation’s depth and breadth were unprecedented in NASA
history.”248
[78] The Board characterized the process to determine the “chain of
circumstances” that caused the Columbia accident “particularly
challenging.”249 It noted the importance of “[e]vidence . . . derived from
film and video [images] of the launch, radar images of Columbia on orbit,
and amateur video of debris shedding during the in-flight breakup . . . [as
well as] sensors onboard the orbiter . . . [and] [a]nalysis of the debris.”250
In the end, the Board determined a piece of foam with the volume of 1200
cubic inches,251 about the size of a large bag of hamster bedding,252 hit

246

See Mark Carreau, Columbia Probe Continues for Some; Gehman, Handful of Others
To Work on Appendices to Disaster Report, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 28, 2003, at A17.
247

1 COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BD., COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
BOARD REPORT 9 (2003), available at http://caib.nasa.gov/news/report/pdf/
vol1/full/caib_report_volume1.pdf.
248

Id. at 11.

249

Id.

250

Id. at 49.

251

See id. at 61.
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Columbia less than a minute-and-a-half after launch, which breached the
Thermal Protection System on the left wing and eventually caused the
wing to fall apart during re-entry.253
[79] It is unlikely that a plaintiff who files suit against a space travel
provider will have the necessary resources to determine whether a defect
caused an accident. As indicated by the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board Report, even a defect as small and insignificant as 1200 cubic
inches material detaching from WhiteKnightTwo and hitting
SpaceShipTwo, is enough to cause a devastating accident.254 Furthermore,
even if a plaintiff had the resources to utilize the expertise necessary to
uncover the cause of space travel accidents, the passenger’s, or the
passenger’s family’s, ability to obtain data related to the cause of an
accident during discovery would hinge on the record keeping practices of
carriers like Virgin Galactic
VI. THE “AMUSEMENT PARK” APPROACH TO STRICT LIABILITY – THE
FRANCIONI MODEL
[80] Neither the FAA/AST nor the courts applying negligence and
product liability theories can ensure commercial space travel carriers and
manufacturers of the spaceships will provide safe vehicles for passengers
to lift-off into space. Thus, Congress must take action to establish a
scheme to protect the public at-large.
[81] The enactment of strict liability schemes applicable to products or
services not previously covered under the traditional approach is not a
novel concept.255 The Ohio legislature, for example, passed a statute
252

See Kaytee Aspen Bedding 1,200 Cubic Inches, ALL FERRET (Aug. 4, 2008),
http://www.allferret.com/406/ kaytee-aspen-bedding-1200-cubic-inches/.
253

See COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BD., supra note 247, at 49.
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See supra notes 247-51 and accompanying text.
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See, e.g., State v. Buehler Food Mkts., Inc., 552 N.E.2d 680, 682 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989)
(citing State v. Lisbon Sales Book Co., 200 N.E.2d 590,592 (Ohio 1964)).

47

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 1

requiring that food intended for sale be packaged according to appropriate
weights and measures.256 The Ohio Court of Appeals, which considered
whether the legislature intended to impose strict liability despite the
statute’s silence on the matter, reasoned that “[t]he more serious the
consequences are to the public, the more likely the legislature meant to
impose liability without fault.”257
[82] In the case of commercial space travel, the safety of the passenger
and the costs of ensuring that safety, necessitate a statute imposing
liability without fault. Still, as previously discussed, the legislature must
refrain from overregulation to ensure the development of commercial
space travel.258 The approach Pennsylvania courts adopt when imposing
strict liability on operators of amusement parks provides that solution.259
This approach uses the following four-factor test:
(1) whether the defendant is the only member of the
marketing chain available to the injured plaintiff for
redress;
(2) whether the imposition of strict liability would serve as
an incentive to safety;
(3) whether the defendant is in a better position than the
consumer to prevent circulation of defective products; and
(4) whether the defendant can distribute the cost of
compensating for injuries resulting from defects by
charging for it in the business.260
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See id. at 681 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1327.61(B) (LexisNexis 2006)).
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Id. at 682.
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See supra Part II.
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See, e.g., Rossetti v. Busch Entm’t Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 415 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
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Id. at 419 (citing Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., 562 A.2d 279, 282 (Pa. 1989)
(citing Francioni, 372 A.2d 736)).
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[83] The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the four factors.261
Congress or the FAA/AST should adopt this standard and explicitly state
that it applies not only to sellers of spaceships, but also to buyers that
maintain and operate spaceships.262 Adopting this standard will protect
future space tourists and ensure the development of commercial space
travel.
A. Whether the Defendant Is the Only Member of the Marketing
Chain Available to the Injured Plaintiff for Redress
[84] The Eastern District of Pennsylvania has interpreted the first
element to require that the plaintiff show he would likely not recover from
the defendant manufacturer before he attempts to recover from another
member of the marketing chain.263 Consequently, the plaintiff must
present “any information regarding the identity of parties other than the
defendant who might have been involved in the marketing chain.”264
Using Virgin Galactic and The Spaceship Company as an example, a
plaintiff will have a difficult time recovering from the companies due to
the nature of their corporate relationship.265 Importantly, this standard will
prevent a plaintiff from suing Virgin Galactic and other travel providers as
other manufacturers supply them with new spaceships. As a result, the
standard keeps regulation during the development of the commercial space
261

See id. at 420 n.3.
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Even in this setting, where Pennsylvania common law authorizes the filing of a
products liability suit against an amusement park operator, courts remain reluctant to
apply the products liability scheme. Compare Coppersmith v. Herco Inc., 29 Pa. D. &
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to combine companies situated similarly to Virgin Galactic and The Spaceship Company
to apply a strict liability scheme).
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travel business to a minimum, and provides plaintiffs with the opportunity
to recover from those responsible for the manufacture of the spaceship.
B. Whether the Imposition of Strict Liability Would
Serve as an Incentive to Safety
[85] The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized this standard
would be little more than “a futile gesture in promoting the manufacture
and distribution of safer products” if the defendant were not “in the
business of designing and/or manufacturing any particular product or
products.”266 But this flexible standard disappears when unrelated
manufacturers begin to make the spaceships used by operators like Virgin
Galactic,267 forcing operators to think twice before pushing a sister
company to place an unsafe product on the market solely for the purpose
of business development. The standard also incentivizes operators to
encourage the private market to manufacture safe spaceships, which will
help eliminate strict liability and negligence claims.
C. Whether the Defendant Is in a Better Position than the Consumer
to Prevent Circulation of Defective Products
[86] According to Pennsylvania courts, the question of whether the
defendant more effectively prevents circulation of defective products
“turns on the existence of an ongoing relationship between the defendant
and the manufacturer ‘from which some financial advantage inures to the
benefit of the [manufacturer] and which confers some degree of influence
on the [defendant]’ in the manufacturing process.”268 Using Virgin
Galactic and The Spaceship Company as an example, the relationship

266

Musser, 562 A.2d at 282.
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See Norris, supra note 3 (stating that presently Virgin Galactic receives spaceships
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Coppersmith, 29 Pa. D. & C.4th at 79 (quoting Musser, 262 A.2d at 282).
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clearly shows The Spaceship Company benefits from Virgin Galactic’s
success as a space tourism provider.269
[87] The second part of this test strengthens the argument that the
operator is in a position to prevent circulation of a defective product.
Virgin Galactic, by reason of its close connection with The Spaceship
Company,270 has significant influence over The Spaceship Company’s
manufacturing process. First and foremost, The Spaceship Company has
only one client, Virgin Galactic, to which it exclusively provides a
product.271 Secondly, with such a limited number of potential space
tourism companies capable of conducting launches in the near future, The
Spaceship Company would have difficulty finding another customer.272
Lastly, the ownership groups of both companies containing at least one
mutual member shows the degree of influence Virgin Galactic maintains
over the manufacturer of its spaceships.273
[88] Importantly, this factor becomes harder for a plaintiff to prove the
more advanced and competitive the commercial space market becomes.
Thus, as more spaceship providers come onto the scene, the easier it
becomes for a plaintiff to bring a claim under traditional strict liability and
negligence, and the Francioni liability scheme will slowly disappear in
favor of more traditional theories of negligence and products liability.
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See Norris, supra note 3 (describing the exclusive relationship between manufacturer
and provider).
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See id.
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See id.
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See Norris, supra note 3. Importantly, this factor likely becomes harder for a plaintiff
to prove the more advanced and competitive the commercial space market becomes.
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D. Whether the Defendant Can Distribute the Cost of Compensating for
Injuries Resulting from Defects by Charging for It in the Business
[89] Of the four factors, the defendant’s distribution of costs is the
easiest for the plaintiff to show. In the same way the Court of Common
Pleas found it “reasonable to conclude that the defendant can distribute the
cost of compensating for injuries resulting from defective products by
charging for it in the price of admission to [an amusement park],”274 it also
seems reasonable to conclude an operator like Virgin Galactic could
distribute costs through ticket sales to eager space tourists. Considering
passengers will already pay $200,000 to ride in space,275 an extra few
thousand dollars for insurance against a strict liability claim will likely not
deter ticket sales, which takes into consideration one of the primary goals
seen in modern courts’ application of products liability as a cost-shifting
platform.276
VI. CONCLUSION – FRANCIONI MODEL ESSENTIAL TO BLAST-OFF!
[90] The liability scheme derived from Francioni provides the
FAA/AST answers to questions concerning liability and RLVs while
protecting the agency from the dangers of agency capture.277 The
FAA/AST should limit regulation regardless of the addition of humans to
RLVs, fostering the long-term innovative development of technologies
that make commercial space travel safer. Limits on regulation remain
especially important considering the FAA/AST does not yet have a
scheme in place to provide this service.278
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[91] But this is not to say that the FAA/AST should disregard the safety
of RLV’s and their passengers. Congress or the FAA/AST should set a
limit on acceptable risk by using the products liability scheme initially
used for assessing amusement park liability.279 Strict liability on operators
like Virgin Galactic, provides passengers a cause of action in difficult
evidentiary cases, while simultaneously allowing the commercial space
travel industry to develop. More importantly, strict liability gives
operators and manufacturers, who both likely have a vested interest in the
operation taking off, a moment of pause to consider the safety of the lives
they carry aboard their newly developed spaceships. Strict liability also
prevents the government from placing obstacles like insurance policy
requirements and other regulatory impediments on the developing
businesses, while at the same time protecting passengers. Just as
important, this strict liability scheme will disappear as soon as the need for
tighter standards for “sister corporations,” protecting operators from
liability, fades with more competition. In turn, the competition will lead
to innovative developments in the commercial space industry.
[92]
A strict liability scheme will ensure the safety of passengers on
board commercial space flights. It will also enact a risk-sharing regime
not necessarily available through regulations targeting a technology still in
development. Thus, to protect passengers, while limiting regulation to
encourage the development of the space tourism business, the
Pennsylvania model of strict liability should serve as the launching pad for
safe commercial space travel to blast off.
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